| Salim Mahmoud Adem Mohammed Bani Amir | |
|---|---|
| Born | 1958 (age 53–54) Kasalu, Sudan |
| Arrested | May 27, 2002 |
| Detained at | Guantanamo |
| Alternate name | Salim Muhood Adem |
| ISN | 710 |
| Charge(s) | No charge (held in extrajudicial detention) |
| Status | Repatriated, December 2007 |
| Occupation | School Principal. |
Salim Mahmoud Adem Mohammed Bani Amir is a citizen of Sudan who was held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detention camps, in Cuba.[1] His Guantanamo Internment Serial Number was 710. Joint Task Force Guantanamo counter-terrorism analysts estimate he was born in 1958, in Kasula, Sudan.
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Amir was among the 60% of prisoners who participated in the tribunal hearings.[2] A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for the tribunal of each detainee. The memo for his hearing lists the following allegations:[3][4]
- The detainee is associated with al Qaida:
- Detainee traveled to Pakistan in 1991.
- Detainee was employed with the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS) since 1994.
- RIHS is suspect of suspected of supporting extremist activity, and some employees are suspected of financing terrorism.
- Illegitimate RIHS funds were reportedly often commingled with legitimate funds and funneled to al Qaida.
- Detainee traveled to Afghanistan in 1998.
- Detainee's residence was identified as a suspected al Qaida residence.
- Detainee was captured in Pakistan and turned over American authorities.
On March 3, 2006, in response to a court order, the Department of Defense published a four-page summarized transcript from his Tribunal.
A writ of habeas corpus, Benny Ah-Amir v. George Walker Bush, et al., was submitted on "Benny Ah-Amir"'s behalf.[5] In response, on 6 July 2005, the Department of Defense released 24 pages of unclassified documents related to his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.
Captive 710's status was considered by Tribunal panel 15 on 1 November 2004 and by Tribunal panel 27 on 15 January 2005. Both Tribunals confirmed the earlier determination that he was an enemy combatant. The record states the second Tribunal was convened due to further evidence. The unclassified record does not indicate the nature of the new evidence.
Commander Karen Gibbs, the Legal Advisor who conducted the legal sufficiency review, wrote:
In my opinion, the majority of the exhibits produced are insufficient to support the decision reached by the CSRT. However, the detainee's own admissions set forth in Enclosure (3) to Encl. (2), combined with Exhibits R-12 through R-16, contain information which a reasonable finder of fact could deem as providing ample support to meet the definition of enemy combatant as set forth in references (a) and (b). Therefore, the proceedings and decision of the Tribunal are legally sufficient, and no corrective action is required.
Many captives' habeas corpus dossiers included a Recorder's exhibit list identifying the titles of exhibits that were not included. Captive 710's dossier doesn't.
In 2006 captive 710 petitioned the court. Because camp authorities had not allowed him to meet with the attorney his family had chosen to help him file his habeas corpus petition.[6] The Department of Justice claimed his attorney had not provided evidence that he was authorized to act as his attorneys. U.S. District Court Judge Alan Kay ruled that previous judicial rulings had not required that attorneys prove they had been authorized prior to visiting with a captive. The previous ruling had merely required that the captive explicitly authorize the attorney within ten days of that first visit.
Kay declined to rule that the George W. Bush administration was in contempt of court.
On June 10, 2006, the Department of Defense reported that three captives died in custody. The Department of Defense stated the three men committed suicide. Camp authorities called the deaths "an act of asymmetric warfare", and suspected plans had been coordinated by the captive's attorneys—so they seized all the captives' documents, including the captives' copies of their habeas documents.[7] Since the habeas documents were privileged lawyer-client communication the Department of Justice was compelled to file documents about the document seizures.
Detainees whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal labeled them "enemy combatants" were scheduled for annual Administrative Review Board hearings. These hearings were designed to assess the threat a detainee may pose if released or transferred, and whether there are other factors that warrant his continued detention.[8]
A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for Salim Mahmoud Adem Mohammed Bani Amir's Administrative Review Board, on 16 September 2005.[9] The memo listed factors for and against his continued detention.
The following primary factors favor continued detention
- a. Connections/Associations
- In late September 1994, the detainee received a position as teacher with Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS). The detainee worked at the Dar al Rabbiaa' wa al Hajiree lil Aytam school. This school is located in a small Pakistani village near Jeluzee called Babbi Ziyarat. The Babbi village is known as an al Qaida activity center.
- RIHS is a Kuwait-based Non-Governmental Organization (NGO). In Pakistan and Afghanistan, it is affiliated with the Afghan Support Committee (ASC), an organization that has funded Usama Bin Laden (UBL) and al Qaida.
- The Peshawar, Pakistan office director of RIHS is Abd al Muhsin al Libi. Al Libi also serves as the ASC manager in Peshawar. Al Libi is known to have a good relationship with UBL and has provided UBL and his associates with facilities in Peshawar.
- The detainee was promoted to manager of the Dar al Rabbiaa' wa al Hajiree lil Aytam school in December, 2001 and remained in this position until captured in May 2002.
- The detainee was the director of an ASC school in Pushtungari.
- Abu Bakr al Jaziri, the finance chief of ASC, was the chief of fundraising for UBL. Al Jaziri collected funds for al Qaida in Jalalabad through the ASC and local Arab NGO's by claiming the funds were for orphans and widoes. In 2000, al Jaziri moved to Pakistan where he continued to raise money and transfer funds for al Qaida.
- On January 9, 2002, RIHS and ASC were added to the list of organizations identified under Executive Order 13224 blocking terrorist property and prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism.
- As of October 2001, Pakistani RIHS employees were funneling money to al Qaida and other Jihadist groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
- When asked of any involvement the detainee might have with al Haramayne he initially stated that he went to an al Haramayne Institute before going to the Islamic Heritage Center.
- On March 11, 2002, al Haramayne was added to the list of organizations identified under Executive Order 13224 blocking terrorist property and prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism.
- b. Other Relevant Data
- When the detainee was captured, he was making a decision to leave Pakistan. Even though his parents are dead, the detainee wanted his remaining relatives to meet his family. The detainee's wife was looking forward to moving to Sudan.
- The detainee traveled to Jalalabad and Kunar, Afghanistan for approximately one week in 1998 in his capacity as principal (director) of the schools of RIHS.
- On May 27, 2002 the detainee was arrested when a foreign government service conducted a series of raids against suspected al Qaida residences and support facilities connected with the ASC in Peshawar, Pakistan.
- Pakistani police held the detainee for 12 days and then sent him to Bagram.
- The detainee is a Sunni Muslim of the Hadith school.
- The detainee went on Hajj in Mecca prior to entering school in 1981.
The following primary factors favor release or transfer
- a. The detainee has no knowledge of al Qaida plans or how funds are transferred to and from Islamic extremist groups or terrorist organizations.
- b. The detainee does not support any type of terrorist organization.
- c. The detainee is just a simple person and is not interested in such issues as the Jihad. He stated that he felt his duty was to teach people.
- d. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11, 2001. He also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
In early September 2007 the Department of Defense released two heavily redacted memos, from his Board, to Gordon England, the Designated Civilian Official.[10][11] The Board's recommendation was unanimous The Board's recommendation was redacted. England authorized his transfer on 18 December 2005.
He and fellow Sudanese Adel Hasan Hamad were repatriated on December 13, 2007.[12] InFocus, a Muslim newspaper in California, extensively quoted from him, after his release:
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On May 14, 2008 the Daily Times of Pakistan reported that "Salim Mahmud Adam" and "Adel Hasan Hamad" had announced plans to sue the United States over their detention.[13] The article reports that he told the Daily Times that his 2004 Combatant Status Review Tribunal had cleared him of the allegation that he was an "enemy combatant".
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